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BACK TO THE FUTURE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

JOHN E. NOWAK*
I will cite very few sources in this commentary, which accompanies
Professor Jerold Israel's Childress Lecture and his article, which anchors this
issue of the Saint Louis University Law Journal. The Professor's article is as

thoroughly researched, and meticulously documented, as one would expect
from one of America's foremost legal scholars. If you have not read Professor
Israel's article, you will not find any research shortcuts here. In any event, I
am sure that other commentators will
supply you with lots of footnote
1
references, and I really hate footnotes.
I chose my title for two reasons in addition to the typical professorial love
of a "cute" title. First, the title fits Professor Israel's article, in which he
renews a plea for openness and honesty in Supreme Court opinions that he
made in his first law review article as a professor. Almost forty years ago, in
his classic article on the overruling of Supreme Court opinions, he called on
the Court for an honest, open explanation of why an opinion would be
overruled. 2 Second, I believe that the approach to incorporation and
application of the Bill of Rights adopted by the Warren Court, and ratified by
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, froze due process analysis in the criminal
law setting (as opposed to due process analysis in administrative law or civil
trial settings) in the 1960s. Professor Israel picks up where scholars of the4
3
1950s and 1960s, such as Justice Walter V. Schaefer, Judge Henry Friendly
and Professor Sanford Kadish,5 left off.
*

David C. Baum Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. How silly: a footnote about hating footnotes! I once talked about this subject in John E.

Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (1985). I swiped the title for that
talk and essay from the late Professor Fred Rodell. In other essays, I have attempted to resurrect
Professor Rodell's brand of legal realism in analyzing constitutional issues. See John E. Nowak,
ProfessorRodell, The Burger Court, andPublic Opinion, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (1984); John
E. Nowak, Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 263 (1980).
2. See Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1372-73 (1977); Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright:
The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211,242-61.
3. See Walter V. Schaefer, Federalismand State Criminal Procedure,70 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2-4 (1956) [hereinafter Schaefer, Federalism]; W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY

(1966).
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HONEST OPINIONS & OPEN BALANCING:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRE-1930 & POST-1970 FORMALISM

Professor Israel has called on the Supreme Court for open, honest
explanations of how the justices used the concept of due process when
deciding criminal law and criminal procedure cases. Professor Israel is not
asking for a rigid form of due process analysis that would allow us to predict
the outcome of every future Supreme Court case so long as the justices on the
Court remained the same. Rather, he is asking only for a clear explanation of
the precise ruling in the case, and an honest statement as to how the majority of
the justices viewed the values inherent in the due process clause when they
made their decision. He offers the Court a variety of possible approaches to
due process analysis, but he only makes a demand for openness and honesty in
opinions. On the way to his conclusion, he shows us how the Court, during an
era of formalism in legal theory, had no coherent theory of due process prior to
the 1930s and how the Court gave up on what the Professor calls "freestanding due process" after it used the incorporation theory to make almost all
of the clauses of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments applicable to
state and local criminal prosecutions.
One of the reasons I believe that a court could achieve the goals set out by
Professor Israel is that I saw a judge who could write such opinions. Thirty
years ago I clerked for Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter V. Schaefer.
Even if I were someone who used footnotes in the normal law review manner,
I would have nothing to cite for the next statements concerning Justice
Schaefer's views of how to write judicial opinions in criminal justice cases.
The following statements are based only on my memory and the memory of
my co-clerk and friend, David M. Spector (who was a student of Professor
Israel's, back when dinosaurs ruled the earth).
Justice Schaefer believed in writing very precise rulings concerning the
decisions in criminal cases, while leaving open the possibility for due process
analysis that would change in the future. He thought that a court's opinion
should state a ruling so precisely that lower courts and law enforcement
officers would have no problems understanding the ruling and applying it in
situations that were substantially similar to those in the case. Nevertheless, the
Justice wrote his opinions (yes, as difficult as this may be to believe, the
Professor turned Justice wrote the opinions himself) so that any reference to
due process principles in the Illinois or U.S. Constitutions would be flexible.
His reasoning in such opinions left open the possibility that the conception of

4. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV.

929 (1965).
5. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
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due process he put forward might be used to come to different conclusions
in
6
evolved.
process
procedure
criminal
the
and
society
as
the future,
Another bias may cause me to interpret Professor Israel's article as I have
done above, and to agree with him. Since my earliest days as a professor, I
have agreed with the position espoused by the late Professor Bickel that U.S.
Supreme Court opinions should be understood as part of a dialogue with the
citizenry rather than merely as technical rulings in specific cases. Bickel
believed the Court, while it may speak to the public, should be aware that it is

part of a dialogue.7 The Supreme Court may not directly react to public
opinion, but the values on which our society has a consensus, or lack thereof,
must be part of every Supreme Court decision. Professor Francis Allen noted
that the Court could only help to change society through opinions that appealed
to shared national values. Without clear, honest opinions from the Court, the
public cannot be expected to fairly evaluate the Court or to be significantly

influenced by it. As Professor Allen noted:
The Warren Court enjoyed its greatest successes when it advanced solutions
that were supported by a broad ethical consensus, as in cases involving the
right of impoverished defendants to counsel in the courtroom .... The central
problem of the Warren Court's activism in the criminal area was not that it
threatened serious abuses of power by politically irresponsible judges. Rather,
it was simply that, despite the Court's ingenious, persistent, and some may
feel, heroic efforts to overcome the inherent limitations
of judicial power, the
8
Court attempted more than it could possibly achieve.

The Supreme Court did not care much about what we now call civil
liberties until the 1920s; it only started to develop due process principles in the
1930s. 9 The Court's first significant action striking a state conviction that was

6. See supra note 3 and infra note 12.
7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1975);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1978).

8. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 540 (1975). Professor Allen's concern with the
identification of fundamental values in the criminal process is reflected throughout his writings.
See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 135-39 (1964); Francis
A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L.
REV. 213, 235 (1959) [hereinafter Allen, Supreme Court]; Francis A. Allen, The Law as a Path to
the World, 77 MICH. L. REV. 157 (1978); Francis A. Allen, Criminal Law and the Modern
Consciousness: Some Observations on Blameworthiness, 44 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1977); Francis
A. Allen, Rights in Conflict: A Balanced Approach, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 223 (1969); Allen, Legal
Values and Correctional Values, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 119 (1968); Francis A. Allen, Federalism
and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Francis A. Allen,
Foreword--Quiescence and Ferment: The 1974 Term in the Supreme Court, 66 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 391 (1975).
9. See Allen, Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 235; John E. Nowak, The "Sixty Something"
Anniversary ofthe Bill of Rights, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 445.
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obtained under the influence of a mob overruled sub silentio one of its earlier
decisions.' 0 Perhaps the Court (like Connecticut, Georgia and Massachusetts,
which ratified the Bill of Rights in 1939) was embarrassed that it had a record
of approving state disregard for individual rights as our nation was coming into
conflict with fascist nations.
One of the major contributions of Professor Israel's article is the
demonstration that the Supreme Court's due process decisions from Hurtado to
the 1930s made little sense, in part because of the confusion concerning the
role of history. After reading the Professor's article, no reasonable person (a
term that may exclude ultra-pro-police department justices) should be able, to
say (with a straight face) that the only processes guaranteed a person charged
with a crime are the processes that were in common usage at the time of the
ratification of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses. It was
not until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that states gave
defendants a right to testify in their own defense."
Could, or should,
prohibition of defendant testimony survive due process analysis in a society
that has greater capability for discovering the truth or falsity of exculpatory
evidence than existed in centuries past? If you think so, your last name must
be Scalia or Thomas.
Professors Israel's calls for open balancing of values in terms of today's
society picks up where Justice Schaefer left off in his Holmes Lecture.
Due process cannot be confined to a particular set of existing procedures
because due process speaks for the future as well as the present, and at any

given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in the light of
then existing values and capabilities. Some features of present procedures are
now accepted by force of custom, or because no practical way has been found
to improve them. Technological change
or a refinement in our sense of justice
2

may make their retention intolerable.'
I must admit that I've given very little thought to complex problems of
criminal procedure since I wrote my one and only article in the area more than
twenty years ago.' 3 I was more than pleased to be part of the panel sessions in
St. Louis and to contribute an essay commenting on Professor Israel's article,
for two reasons. First, I have the greatest respect for Jerry Israel. Second, to
those who doubted me decades ago I wanted to say, "I told you so." I see
10. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (overruling sub silentio Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915)). This point was made by Judge Friendly. See Friendly, supra note 4, at 937.
The Frank case involved a situation in which anti-Semitism, as well as mob influence, played a
part in the trial. At least one made for television movie-"The Murder of Mary Phegan"-was
made about the facts of the Frank case.
11. See Schaefer, Federalism,supra note 3, at 2.
12. See id. at 6.
13. John E. Nowak, Foreword-DueProcessMethodology in the PostincorporationWorld,

70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1979).
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Professor Israel's article as a great scholar opening the door to reconsideration
of using a due process methodology in the interpretation of Bill of Rights
provisions. After all, no state appears before the Supreme Court asking: "Can
we please have unreasonable, warrantless searches and seizures?"; or "Will
you please let us compel a person's testimony through torture and other
coercive practices?" No, the Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases involve
difficult fact situations that require balancing our societal interest in efficient
law enforcement and our society's desires for a process that is fundamentally
fair and that respects human dignity.
In that long ago article, I used the works of Francis Allen, Walter Schaefer,
and, primarily, Sanford Kadish [whose due process methodology is explained
in Professor Israel's article] to take the position that incorporation of specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause and application of
those provisions in an identical manner to federal and local law enforcement
systems would be of value only to nine persons, the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court. At first, incorporation allowed a Warren Court Justice
to say "I wasn't expanding these rights based on my personal choice, the
[Fourth, Fifth, Sixth or whatever] Amendment made me do it." Incorporation
turned out to be a two-edged sword. A Justice of the Burger and Rehnquist
Court could say: "It's not my fault that I'm approving what seems to be an
unfair process, it's just that the issue involves only the meaning of the [Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth or whatever] Amendment and that Amendment doesn't help the
defendant in this case."
Judge Henry Friendly predicted that post-incorporation decisions might be
a disaster for the Court. He warned: "There is grave risk of self-delusion in the
reiterated references to the declaration of fundamental principles in the Bill of
Rights as 'specifics'; ...So let us hope, as true friends of the Court, that in the

fullness of time, it will escape from the 'verbal prison' it has been building for
doctrine and will regain the 'sovereign
itself by selective incorporation
'""14
choice.
of
prerogative
How could the Court incorporate the due process analysis of Professor
Israel, Francis Allen, Sanford Kadish and Walter Schaefer, into opinions on
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as opinions focusing solely on
one of the due process clauses? Here's one possibility.
First, the Court should face the question of judicial interpretation openly and
identify the values that are involved in the case. The opinion should note the
precise Bill of Rights or due process clause issues and the problem of defining
and protecting values when no historical means exist for arriving at a fixed
meaning for the constitutional provision in question.

14. Friendly, supra note 4, at 937-38.
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Second, the Court should determine the importance of the values endangered
by the state's practice. The opinion should inquire into either the nature of the
values reflected in the Bill of Rights provision at issue in the case or the
general principles of due process, i.e., protection of individual dignity, equality
of treatment, and traditional conceptions of fairness.
Third, the Court should examine the impact of a ruling (for or against the
defendant) on the reliability of the guilt-determination process, and it should

evaluate the cost of administering a system with the procedural safeguard, if
any, sought by the defendant. This portion of the analysis involves questions
of economic and social costs, including the difficulty of administering a system
of justice with limited resources and expanded procedures.
Fourth, the Court should determine whether the due process or Bill of Rights
values outweigh the social costs of a ruling adverse to the state. This entails
more than a mere utilitarian balancing test; it involves explicit reasoning in the
opinion that confronts the question of the extent to which the state practice
endangers fundamental constitutional values. Further, the court openly should
examine whether this society's historic
and philosophic commitment to those
15
values requires it to bear the costs.
THE COST OF INCORPORATION:
MIRANDA VS. THE DUE PROCESS SCHOLARS

We can see the cost of the Court's failure to use a due process
methodology in cases concerning whether a defendant's confession was
"voluntary." The voluntariness issue presents us with a clear example of how
incorporation stifled due process analysis, and prevented open consideration of
clashes between individual and societal interests. Every day trial courts must
determine whether or not a confession was made voluntarily so as to comply
with both due process and Fifth Amendment principles. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of the post-incorporation era has been of no help to these
courts.

The HarvardLaw Review, in a Development Note in 1966, said of the due
process voluntary confession cases to that time: "The Court's cases suggest
that the due process voluntariness standard has three possible goals: (1)
ensuring that convictions are based on reliable evidence; (2) deterring
improper police conduct; or (3) assuring that a defendant's confession is the
product of his free and rational choice."' 16 The Development Note then went
on to show how the Court's opinions were capable of being read as favoring
one or another of the goals as the primary consideration in voluntariness cases.
One thing that can be said for all those cases from the1930s to the 1960s, as

15. Nowak, Foreword, supra note 13, at 401-02.
16. Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV 935, 963-64 (1966).
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difficult as they were for students to summarize, is that the cases involved open
balancing of the needs of society for efficient police investigation against
values of individual dignity that were part of our history and traditions.
The problem defendants face today in proving the confession was
involuntary is the same problem that they faced more than thirty years ago.
Unfortunately, state courts and lower federal courts are no better equipped to
make voluntariness determinations, in terms of guiding principles from the
Supreme Court, than they were thirty years ago.
The Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona 17 in 1966, after decades of
cases struggling to define whether a confession was voluntary. The Miranda
Court focused so intently on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment that it forgot to
use the due process methodology developed in cases from the 1930s and
1960s. The cases following Mirandaended the Supreme Court inquiry into the
principles of fairness, respect for individual dignity, and the needs of society
for efficient law enforcement that would have followed from a due process
methodology.
Although there were still some voluntariness cases to decide in the 1960s,
it took only a few years for the focus on Miranda technicalities to replace any
open consideration of the intersection of due process and the Fifth Amendment
in Supreme Court opinions. Professor Israel's and his Florida faculty
colleague's student treatises on criminal procedure cite only a few post-1971
Supreme Court decisions concerning the voluntariness of confessions, and
most of those cases focus on the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, not on the
voluntariness of the confession itself. 8 It almost seems like, if you get a
Miranda waiver, it is okay for police to coerce a defendant!
The Miranda ruling, if not the Court's opinion, probably was a valuable
one because, thanks to television and movies since 1966, every man, woman
and child in the United States should now be aware of their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. There may well have been no attempt to stop the third
degree practices of the "bad old days," if Miranda had not focused national
attention (if only due to the controversy about the ruling) on coercive police
practices. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the Miranda ruling has really
helped individual defendants whose confessions were involuntary. Those
persons who believe that Miranda was a great triumph for the rights of
defendants must spend all of their time in classrooms. Years ago, when I
taught criminal procedure courses, if one of my students said that the Miranda
warnings would prevent coerced confessions, I would reply: "Either you just
moved to Illinois, or you've already been in law school too long." Perhaps my

17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 6.2

(3d ed. 2000); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS, ch. 16 (4th ed. 2000).
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view of Miranda is' tainted by the fact that I live in Illinois. The law
enforcement abuses that cause confession and convictions in capital cases to be
so untrustworthy that our governor declared a moratorium on capital
punishment would not have been cured by Miranda or any of its progeny. It
seems unlikely, at least to this old, jaded professor, that police officers who lie
about torturing a defendant to get a confession will tell the truth when asked
about whether they gave the Miranda warnings to a defendant and received
permission to interrogate him.
In 1965, in Griffin v. California,19 the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment prohibited a prosecutor or judge from commenting in front of a
jury, on the defendant's failure to testify. The Griffin Miranda combination
effectively stopped any ability of state courts to develop interrogation systems
that differed from the formal Miranda structure, even if the alternatives might
have provided a better balance of individual and societal interests.
Specifically, those decisions took away the ability of any court [including the
Supreme Court, unless it was to overrule Griffin and Miranda] to examine the
system Yale Kamisar termed the "Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model" for
suspect interrogation. 20 Those three scholars wished to use the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, together with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, to prohibit virtually all confessions that were not made before a
defendant was presented to a magistrate. Professor Kamisar summarized their
proposal as follows:
If one were to revise it [Kauper's Proposal] in light of subsequent
developments and the great dialogue they stimulated, the "modernized"
version would present an attractive alternative to the Miranda model.
Such revisitation and revision of the old Kauper plan has in fact
occurred-most notably by two of the most eminent critics of Escobedo and
Miranda, Justice Walter Schaefer and Judge Henry Friendly. A modernized
version, based largely on their writings, might take approximately the form of
the five provisions that follow:
1. A person taken into custody because of, or charged with, a crime to
which an interrogation relates, may be questioned only in the presence of and
under the supervision of a judicial officer.

19. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
20. Yale Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years LaterSome Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 32 (1973); Paul G. Kauper,
Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224,
1239 (1932), reprintedin 73 MICH. L. REV. 39, 54 (1974). See supra notes 3-4. See also Roscoe
Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017 (1934); W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY, supra note 3, at
76-81.
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2. The person shall immediately (that is, as soon as humanly possible) be
brought before a judicial officer who shall, before questioning begins,
determine the existence of the grounds for detention or arrest.
3. The judicial officer shall give the person the familiar Miranda warnings
and, in addition, inform him that if he is subsequently prosecuted his refusal to
answer any questions will be disclosed at the trial.
4. A complete written record shall be kept of the judicial examination; the
information of rights, any waiver thereof, and any questioning shall be
recorded upon a sound recording device; and the suspect shall be so informed.
5. The questions shall be asked by police officers or prosecuting attorneys
rather than the judicial officer, but only
in the presence of the judicial officer,
21
who may intervene to prevent abuse.
Under the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model, few defendants' statements
would be admissible against the defendant unless those statements were made
under the supervision of a judicial office. In exchange for having a strict rule
on how police could get confessions that were truly voluntary, the suggested
model would have allowed prosecutors to comment on a defendant's failure to
make a statement in his defense. Adoption of their proposal would require a
focus on due process values and open balancing of the needs of society against
the threat to fundamental values presented by coercive police practices. It
would also require rejection of the Court's decision regarding comments on a
defendant's silence.
Use ,of an open due process type analysis, might have resulted in a very
different opinion in Dickerson v. United States22 and a renewal of interest in
the development of procedures that might actually stop coercive police
interrogation of suspects and unreliable confessions.
In Dickerson, the Justices [except for the you-could-have-guessed-whichtwo] rejected a congressional attempt to disregard the Miranda ruling. That
case, as indicated by the vote of the Justices, was an easy one, because the
congressional act did not provide any safeguards against police coercion. If
the Dickerson opinion had been framed in due process terms, the Court could
have revived interest in how a society with modem technology could limit
coercive police practices without suppressing voluntary confessions. A due
process-based opinion in Dickerson would have described Miranda as having
been based on due process clause values. Our hypothetical Dickerson opinion
would have explained that Miranda was simply the best way a court in the
1960s could have balanced a defendant's right not to be coerced and the
interest of society in allowing police interrogation that respected principles of
fairness and individual dignity. Finally, the opinion would have emphasized
21. Kamisar, supra note 20, at 23-32 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
22.

120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
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how, with modem technology, the state or federal governments could create a
law enforcement system that could eliminate the need for Miranda warnings
while protecting against coercive police practices.
Had Dickerson been a true due process opinion, it might have encouraged
legislatures to take a new look at the types of processes suggested by Professor
Kauper, Professor &.Justice Schaefer, and Judge Friendly. Technology, as
Justice Schaefer might have said, has made Miranda useless and his model
possible. If parents at intermission at the theater can monitor how their baby is
being treated by the babysitter, it should be possible to provide judicial
screening of interrogation practices without unduly burdening law
enforcement.
Even with better Supreme Court opinions, there might not be a revival of
interest in the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model, because it would provide real
protection against the type of police abuses that have made headlines in
California and Illinois. Police may well prefer Miranda over a truly fair
system for the interrogation of suspects.
"CAN'T ANYBODY HERE PLAY THIS GAME?

' 23

Professor Israel has noted (complete with lots of footnote references for
you) the Court's failure to add any consideration of fundamental values to the
utilitarian balancing test it has used in procedural due process cases apart from
criminal cases. 24 Professor Israel's article also shows how badly the current
justices perform when they use substantive due process analysis in cases
involving the administration of our criminal justice system.
Most "criminal procedure" cases actually present substantive due process
issues, rather than procedural issues.
In cases in which the Fourth
Amendment is the primary issue, a defendant is asserting that his substantive
right to privacy has been violated, rather than asking for some new procedures.
In virtually all Fifth Amendment "voluntariness cases," the defendant is
asserting that his substantive right to be free from being coerced into
confessing to a crime has been violated.

23. This statement is a quote from the late, great Casey Stengel about the 1962 New York
Mets. My less cleverly worded view of the current majority of Supreme Court Justices is set out
in John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme
Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091 (2000).
24. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-StandingDue Processand Criminal Procedure:The Supreme
Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303 (2001). For an examination
of these procedural due process cases, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, chs. 10 & 13 (6th ed. 2000); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, ch. 17 (3d ed. 1999).

25. On the distinction between procedural and substantive due process, see NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 24, at § 10.6.
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After thirty years of talking about due process cases as if they were only
technical Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court
seems to have lost the ability to discuss substantive procedural issues in
26
criminal justice administration situations. County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
discussed in Professor Israel's article, shows that, perhaps due to a lack of
27
practice, the Court is really bad when it comes to dealing with such problems.
In Lewis, the Justices unanimously ruled that the negligence of a police
officer, which caused the death of an innocent motorcycle rider (on a
motorcycle that the police had a right to chase), did not violate due process.
The court was able to narrow the issues to the question of whether the police
officer's actions violated substantive due process. The best test the majority
could come up with for this case was the "shock-the-conscience test." But that
test was developed in the 1930s-1960s era for the examination of intentional
police actions designed to secure evidence or testimony from a defendant.
Lower courts needed guidance regarding how they should address the
questions presented when the police unintentionally take a person's life, liberty
or property. In part because of its use of a test that was never intended to deal
with such situations, the Lewis court avoided questions concerning whether the
family of the deceased was entitled to any compensation under the takings
clause or whether there were any violations of procedural due process
principles. The use of the shock-the-conscience test, and the narrowing of the
issues, make the Lewis decision useless.
Here's a type of problem referred to in one of my favorite books called the
"little Johnny hypothetical."
In our hypothetical, little Johnny, an only child, is attending his first day of
school. His mother and father are at home at their little house, which,
unfortunately, happens to be quite close to a highway. A state police officer,
in pursuit of the suspect, is driving his police car negligently, grossly
negligently, or recklessly. Because of the negligent, grossly negligent, or
reckless actions of the police officer, his squad car leaves the street and hits the
house of little Johnny's parents. Both of Johnny's parents are killed; the house
catches fire and bums to the ground. Little Johnny has lost his parents (his
sole sources of support) and virtually all of the family economic resources
(because his parents could not afford adequate insurance, and had very little
equity in the property). Little Johnny finds a kindly attorney to bring suit
against the state; the state admits negligent, grossly negligent, or reckless
conduct on the part of the police officer. Nevertheless, the state refuses to pay
any money to little Johnny on the basis of a state law that granted state and
local governments sovereign immunity. On these facts would the state have
taken little Johnny's property or liberty and trusts in violation of due process?
26. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
27. See Israel, supra note 24, at 402-03. For more details regarding this case, see NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 24, at § 10.6 (f).
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Would the state have violated the taking of property clause, which applies to
state and local governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment? Is little Johnny under these facts, entitled to some type of
compensation from the state? These are questions that were left unanswered in
Lewis. 28

Perhaps the Court in Lewis was unable to deal with the entire set of
problems in the case because the Justices were unaccustomed to using due
process analysis in cases involving police activity. However, I suspect that the
reason the Lewis Court did not address all these issues is the same reason that
Professor Israel's call for open, honest due process opinions will never be
followed by the Justices. Writing the type of opinion called for by Professor
Israel is very difficult. Justices who have time for moot courts, lectures and
summer vacations, that even professors envy, don't have time to write such
opinions. On the other hand, it should not be hard to instruct an army of law
clerks on how to write opinions that mask due process issues in terms of
technical interpretations of specific Bill of Rights provisions.
I guess my only conclusion should be that we should add being a Supreme
Court Justice to a list [which would include golf and sex] of "The top ten
things you can have fun doing, even if you're not very good at it." However, I
can't resist tossing in another quote from my favorite author.
At the end of each term it may appear that the results of the cases are the most
important aspect of the Court's work. However, it is the decision-making
process, as reflected in the opinions of the Court that is most important. While
today's rulings may be limited or overturned tomorrow, if the Court indicates
that it will form constitutional rules based on fiat rather than on reason, its
authority inevitably will be called in question. Adoption of the due process
methodology model for decisions in both due process and Bill of Rights cases
procedure decisions, on its
would focus the court's attention, in all criminal
29
basic function of finding constitutional values.

If courts adopted Professor Israel's suggestion for how to write opinions in
due process cases, we might have open, honest opinions that would command
public respect. Thanks for trying, Jerry!

28. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 24, at 394-95.

The omitted footnote referred to E. LEVI, AN
29. Nowak, supra note 13, at 423.
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949), and Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiatin Case Law,
59 HARv. L. REV. 376 (1946).
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